Bullion
Volume 29

Number 2

Article 2

6-2005

Banking sector reforms and bank consolidation: The Malaysian
experience.
Okorie A. Uchendu
Central Bank of Nigeria

Follow this and additional works at: https://dc.cbn.gov.ng/bullion
Part of the Finance Commons, and the International Economics Commons

Recommended Citation
Uchendu, O. A. (2005) Banking sector reforms and bank consolidation: The Malaysian experience. CBN
Bullion, 29(2), 12-16.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by CBN Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Bullion by an authorized editor of CBN Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact
dc@cbn.gov.ng.

l/June 2005

Volume 29 No. 2

BANKING SECTOR REFORMS AND
BANK CONSOLIDATION:
THE MALAYSIAN EXPERIENCE
By
O. A. UCHENDU, Ph.D"

interstate branching. II. Conceptual
Banking sector reforms,

incorporating

Issues

in Banking Sector
Reform and Bank

consolidation, have also Consolidation

I.

been implemented in
Introduction
Europe, Asia, Latin Banking sector reforms
America and Africa at and its sub-component,
anking sector different times for bank consolidation, have

reform

and different reasons.
resulted from deliberate
consolidation, n
policy response to correct
particular, has The Malaysian banking perceived or impending
been an on-going sector reform, which banking sector crises and
phenomenon. It has, resulted from the Asian subsequent failures. A
however, re cently financial crises of the banking crisis can be
intensified due to forces of 199Os, is the subject of triggered
by the
globalization, which are this study. The purpose preponderance of weak
guiding the integration of of this paper therefore, is banks characterized by
the world's financial to share the Malaysian persistent illiquidity,
markets and economies. experience in light of the insolvency, under In the United States of on-going banking sector capitalisation, high level
America alone, the reform and consolidation of non-performing loans
number of banks declined in Nigeria. The rest of the and weak corporate
steadily due to paper is divided into three governance, among
consolidation from about sections. Conceptual others, as observed in the
14,OOO in the mid-8os to issues in banking sector Nigerian case. Similarly,
L2,212 in 1990 and r8form and bank highly open economies,
further to 8,252 a decade consolidation is covered in especially, those with
later. The firstwave of the Section II. The Malaysian weak
financial
mergers/acquisitions in experience in banking infrastructure, can be
the
198Os was sector reforms and bank very vulnerable to
precipitated by attempts consolidation is discussed banking crises emanating
by stronger banks to in Section III, while from other jurisdictions
acquire weaker and lessons for Nigeria and through the contagion
undercapitalized ones, concluding remarks are effect as experienced in
while the second resulted presented in Section IV.
Asia (Thailand, Indonesia,
from a response to a
South Korea and
legislation that liber alized
Malaysia) and South
Offrce of the Governor's Department,
O.M. Fakiyesi, Mr. M. Jubrin, Mrs. H.
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those ofthe author and do not
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in the

America (Brazil)
1990s.

Banking crisis usually
starts with bank's

inability to meet its
financial obligations to its

stakeholders. This, in
most cases, precipitates
runs on banks as they
and their customers
engage in massive credit
recalls and withdrawals.
Quite often, this situation
necessitates central bank
liquidrty support. In some
acute cases, governments,
through the collaboration

of international finance
institutions such as the
International Monetary
Fund (IMF), intervene to

stem the crisis from
widening and deepening.

The

intervention
mechanisms may occur in
the form of consolidation
(mergers and acquisitions),

recapitalisation, use of
bridge banks, establishrrrerrt

of asset management
companies to assume
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system,

embrace
glob alization, improve
healthy competition,
exploit economies of
scale, adopt advanced
technologies, raise
efficiency and improve
profitability. Ultimately,

UI. The Malaysian

developmental role of ensuing banking sector
enhancing economic reforms have generated

which tremendous public/

growth,

subsequently leads to research interest because
improved overall of the extent of the
economic performance resilience of the linancial
system and the economy
and societal welfare.

as

a

whole in

.Despite the above withstanding the impact
expected benefits, of the Asian financial
banking sector reforms crisis that ravaged its
have their associated neighbours. One account

costs. Apart from job of the crisis by the IMF
losses which could have, indicates that the Asian
nevertheless, occurred if crisis started on March 3,
remedial measures were 1997 when Thailand
not taken, gross country announced that it was
cost estimates to facing financial dfficulties

national

salvageable banks.

a

Bank consolidation,

always far outweigh the
costs in the rnedium to
long term.

that they are able to crisis which occurred in
perform
their the 1990s and the

liquidation of non-

bank as$ets, and outright

reforms, the benefits

the goal is to strengthen Experience
the intermediation role
of banks and to ensure The Malaysian financial

economies
resulting from banking
sector reforms are
eno[nous, ranging from

control and recovery of

spi of the huge sums
spent on banking sector

as a result of massive

capital flight. The country
then introduced some
remedial rheasr.rres, which

low L2 per cent of GDP did not stop the crisis
forMalaysia, 15 per cent from quiCkly spreading to
of GDP for Korea to 45 otherAsian countries. To

which is at the core of
most banking system
reform programmes,

per cent of GDP for ward off the contagion
Indonesia. Merrill effects, Malaysia initiated

occurs, some of the time,

estimated

independent of any

banking

crisis.

Irrespective of the cause,

bank
however,
is
consolidation
implemented
to
strengthen the banking

Lynch independently policy measures in April

andJuly of 1997 to curtail
banks exposure to the real
estate sub-sector and
capital markets, and
aggressively defended the
42 for Indonesia, 1O for national currency (ringgit)
Korea, 11 for Malaysia exchange rate, which it
and 26 for Thailand. In eventually floated. This

the
re c apitalization co sts
component as per cent
of GDP for commercial
banks to be as high as

12'".
:.t:r

.r.lli'
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per cent) and interest compared to the other
other policy interventions costs (2 per cent); and 50 countries where their
in 1998 and 1999 which per cent of GDP or $US85 banking sector was highly
included instituting a billion in the Indonesian dominated by government

was followed by a series of

blanket guarantee for all case, broken down into ownership. Besides,
bank depositors, a liquidity support (12 per Malaysia's well developed
programme of bank cent), recapitalization, capital market was
r e c a p i t a liz a t i o n , including
deposit reported to have limited
(23 per banking sector linancing
guarantee
fund
establishment of an asset
management company cent), purchase of non- exposure.
and bank restructuring performing loan or capital
and recapitalization for asset management Buoyed by its strong
agency as well as the company (12 per cent) and economic fundamentals
introduction of capital interest cost (3 per cent). and guided by a well laid
controls.
In addition, Korea spent out Financial Sector
at least 13 per cent of its Master Plan implemented
Specifically, the key GDP or $US+O billion to since 2001, Malaysia has
elements of the Malaysian respond to the Asian recovered from the
banking sector reform financial crisis.
negative impacts of the
centered on beefing up
Asian crisis. Real GDP

prudential regulations A maj or reason why growth rate which

and the establishment of Malaysia may have better contractedto -7.4 per cent
Danamodal Nasional withstood the impact of in 1998 from 7.3 per cent
Berhad and Danaharta the crisis and spent less in 1997, grew by 5.6, 8.9,
Nasional Berhad to in weathering the problem 0.3, 4.1, 5.3 and 7.0 per
consolidate, recap italize was attributable to its cent between 1999 and
and rationalize finance strong macroeconomic 2OO4 and is projected to
and banking institutions fundamentals at the time. grow by 6 per cent in
by applying least cost Prior to the Asian crisis in 2OO5. During the same
solution principles to 1997, inflation rate in period, inflation was
minimize the injection of Malaysia as at end 1996 subdued. Rising frorn2.7
public
funds. was 3.5 per cent, per cent in 1986 to 5.3 in
Accordingly, between compared to 7.9 per cent L997 inflation declined to
1999 and 2OO1, 54 in Indonesia, 4.9 per cent 2.8, L.5, L.4,1.8, 1.1,1.4,
banking institutions were in Korea, 8.4 per cent in per cent between 1998
consolidated into l0 Philippines and 5.9 per and 2OO4 with 2.5 per
banking groups. By the cent in Thailand. cent estimated for 2OO5.
first quarter of 1999, Furthermore, most of the Similarly, net nonMalaysia had spent 5 per capital inflows into performing loans, based
cent of its GDP or $4.O Malaysia were of longer on
a
6-month
purchase
billion to
non- term nature in the form of classification which
performing loans (3 per foreign direct investment, peaked at 7.5 per cent in
cent) and recapitalize while the borrowing of 2OO2 from 6.4 per cent in
banks (2 per cent) foreign currency above 1999, declined steadily to
compared to 25 per cent certain level was restricted 5.4 per centinApril 2OO5,
of GDP or $34 billion in by government. Malaysia, while other prudential
Thailand made up of also had only one large ratios remained strong
liquidity support (15 per government-owned during those periods.
cent), recapitalization (8 commercr
bank
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IV.

Lessons for Nigeria
and Concluding Remarks

financial positions and shocks with minimum
liaised with the IMF for cost, especially in an
technical support. It also

integrated global economy

While the Nigerian granted the following where advances in
banking sector reform was forbearance on April 1 1, information
and
a proactive response to 2OO5 to a group of weak communication
the weakening of the banks to further enhance technology help to
banking system, the the banking sector transmit disturbances
Malaysian experience, reform:
very fast and widely.
resulted from the r a write-off of 80 per Similarly, the overall
contagion effect from the
package
cent of the long policy
Asian financial crisis. In
outstanding debts implemented to restore
both cases, the
owed to the CBN by financial and banking
weak banks under system stability after the
strict pre-conditions
out-break of a crisis is
I conversion of the also complementary to
balance of 20 per cent ensuring a favourable
The 13-point reform
of the debt to a long outcome. The prompt
agenda adopted by Nigeria
term loan of 7 years at creation of a separate
authorities identified the
need to take decisive
policy actions to revamp
their banking systems.

on 6ft July, 2OO4 as part

of the broader National
Economic Empowerment
and Development Strategy
(NEEDS) prograrnme was
intended to stem the slide
in the Nigerian banking
system and to refocus it
to play its intermediation
role more effectively. TWo

very

r

3 per cent per annum
including two years
moratorium
a further forbearance
of 20 per cent of the
debt if the new owners
of the banks meet the
new N25 billion capital
base.

restructuring

agency

(Danamodal Nasional

Berhad) and Danaharta
Nasional Berhad (an asset
mzrnagement company) to

handle the Malaysian
crisis immensely aided the

implementation

and
success of the banking
sector reform and

While there has been restructuring prograrrune.
components of the reform measurable progress It is hoped that the CBN
agenda were the towards the realization of would hasten efforts in
requirements for banks to the goals of the reform the establishment of an
increase
their programme, of which its AMC as proposed in the
shareholders' funds to a appraisal is outside the reform agenda.
important

minimum of N25 billion
and to consolidate their

operations through

mergers and acquisition
before the end of 2OO5.

To fast-track the

scope of this paper, there
are lessons that can be
learnt from the Malaysian
experience. An important

In addition, the design of
a Financial Sector Master

Plan provided the

lesson discernable from Malaysian authorities
the Malaysian experience with a long-term roadmap
is the need to build an for the revival of the
economy based on strong financial sector. In
and recognition of its peculiar
economic
operating environment,
institutional
fundamentals. This is a Malaysia developed a

implementation of the
programme, the CBN
issued a number of
circulars to guide
stakeholders, granted key precondition for viable Islamic financial
amnesty to banks for past economies to absorb and services industry which
misreporting of their withstand external integrated seamlessly
14

I
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with the traditional
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